Comparative Philosophy Volume 7, No. 1 (2016): 20-38
Open Access / ISSN 2151-6014
www.comparativephilosophy.org

MORAL SAINTS, HINDU SAGES,
AND THE GOOD LIFE
CHRISTOPHER G. FRAMARIN
ABSTRACT: Roy W. Perrett argues that the Hindu sage, like the western moral saint,
seems precluded from pursuing non-moral virtues, interests, activities, relationships, and so
on for their own sakes. A life devoid of every such pursuit seems deficient. Hence, the Hindu
sage seems to forsake the good life. In response, I adapt a reply that Vanessa Carbonell
offers in the context of the moral saint. The Hindu sage might pursue non-moral virtues,
interests, activities, relationships, and so on for their own sakes, so long as his motivation to
pursue mokṣa is read de re rather than de dicto. Indeed, this reply is more convincing in the
case of the Hindu sage than it is in the case of the moral saint.
Keywords: welfare, well-being, the good life, renunciation, asceticism, Hindu sage, moral
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1. INTRODUCTION
Classical Hindu texts tend not to outline their conceptions of welfare (in the sense of
personal well-being) explicitly.1 But since they tend to count the life of the sage as
exceedingly good for him, it makes some sense to think that a theory of the good life
________________________
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There seem to be exceptions to this general claim. The first is the Bhagavadgītā (Gītā), in which
Kṛṣṇa enjoins Arjuna to act for the sake of lokasaṃgraha – which might be understood as something
like the welfare of the world (Bhagavadgītā 3.20, 3.25). The notion of world welfare, however, is
distinct from the notion of personal, individual welfare.
Nonetheless, the two are presumably related. The welfare of the world presumably depends at
least in part on how well individuals fare within that world. If this is right, then any analysis of world
welfare in the Gītā or elsewhere will depend at least in part on an accurate analysis of personal welfare.
This is another reason to think that the arguments of this paper have broad importance. Another
apparent exception is the Arthaśāstra. The Arthaśāstra discusses something akin to world welfare as
well (or kingdom welfare), as a means to the welfare of the king. Much work would need to be done,
however, to infer a more general theory of the good life from these discussions.
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might be inferred from his example. It makes some sense to think that these texts take
a life to be good for the person whose life it is insofar as it exemplifies those
characteristics that make the sage’s life good for the sage.
The plausibility of any such theory will depend, at least in part, on whether the
Hindu sage does indeed live the good life. One way to assess whether the sage does
indeed live the good life is to consider objections to the claim that his life is good for
him.
The objection that I consider in this paper is an objection that Roy W. Perrett
adapts from Susan Wolf. The objection states that the moral ideal of the Hindu sage,
who dedicates himself single-mindedly to the pursuit of the highest good of mokṣa
(liberation), is inconsistent with the pursuit of non-moral virtues, interests, activities,
relationships, and so on for their own sakes. A life entirely devoid of every such
pursuit seems deficient. So the life of the Hindu sage seems deficient. I call this the
‘Precluded Pursuits Objection.’
One seemingly promising reply to the Precluded Pursuits Objection claims that
mokṣa is a non-moral end. If mokṣa is a non-moral end, then it is false that the sage’s
single-minded pursuit of mokṣa precludes his pursuit of non-moral ends. Nonetheless,
the sage’s single-minded pursuit of mokṣa still seems to preclude his pursuit of nonmoral virtues, interests, activities, relationships, and so on for their own sakes. He
only pursues these things insofar as they contribute toward the attainment of mokṣa.
His life still seems deficient for this reason.
This initial reply can be supplemented, however, by a reply that Vanessa
Carbonell offers to Wolf’s objection in the context of the moral saint. Carbonell
argues that Wolf mistakenly characterizes the moral saint’s motivation to improve the
general welfare as a de dicto, rather than a de re motivation. If the saint is motivated
to improve the general welfare de dicto, then he has only one underived motivation:
namely, the motivation to improve the general welfare. This is problematic. If he is
motivated to improve the general welfare de re, however, then he might have a
distinct, underived motivation to bring about each of the ends that contribute to the
improvement of the general welfare. Consequently, he might pursue each of these
ends for its own sake.
Carbonell’s reply to the Precluded Pursuits Objection fails in the case of the moral
saint. Even if the moral saint pursues ends other than the improvement of the general
welfare for their own sakes, and even if some of these ends are non-moral in some
sense, the saint’s commitments to these non-moral ends are shallow and contingent.
The saint must abandon them as soon as they no longer contribute sufficiently to the
improvement of the general welfare. His life seems deficient for this reason.
The Hindu sage’s pursuit of ends that contribute to the attainment of mokṣa, in
contrast, are not shallow in this way, because their relations with the end of mokṣa are
necessary and enduring. Hence, the Hindu sage ideal avoids the Precluded Pursuits
Objection.
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2. SAGES AND THE GOOD LIFE
I begin with the assumption that many Hindu texts and traditions take the sage to live
an especially good life. To say that the sage lives a good life in this sense is to say
that he lives well, and to say that he lives well is to say that he lives a life that is
intrinsically good for him.
If the sage’s life is intrinsically good for him, then it is good independently of
how good it is for others, and independently of how good it is as a means to some
future life. This is not to say that the sage’s life is not good in these other senses as
well. It is just to say that these are not the senses of the good life with which I am
concerned in this paper.2
If certain Hindu texts and traditions take the life of the sage to be exceedingly
good for him, then it might turn out that the inference from Hindu conceptions of
sagehood to an account of the good life is straightforward. A person’s life might be
intrinsically good for him insofar as it exemplifies those characteristics that make the
life of the sage good for the sage.
If the sage’s life is good for him because it contains a good deal of joy, for
example, then presumably episodes of (relevantly similar) joy contribute to the
intrinsic value of a life more generally. If the sage’s life is good for him because he is
free (in some sense to be specified), then presumably (relevantly similar) episodes of
freedom contribute to the intrinsic value of a life in general, and so on.
Now of course, there is more than one Hindu conception of sagehood, and even
after these conceptions are broadly categorized, they are characterized in different
ways by different texts and traditions. 3 I mean to limit myself to the saṃnyāsin
(renunciate) and karmayogin (disciplined actor) ideals in particular. Both are found in
the Mahābhārata, 4 the Bhagavadgītā being not only the locus classicus of the
karmayogin ideal, but also a source for criticism of the saṃnyāsin ideal. The
Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads detail the behaviors and intentions of the saṃnyāsin in some of
the most detail, and the Yogaśāstra 5 offers one of the earliest and most thorough
justifications for his mode of life, in the form of a wide ranging metaphysics, moral
2

The sage’s life might be extrinsically (or instrumentally) good for these reasons. The fact that the
sage’s life benefits others might also make it morally good (Feldman 2004, 8-9).
3
For a sample of the complexity of these categories among contemporary Hindu traditions, see
Richard Burghart (1983, 641-44).
4
Peter Hill cites a number of passages from the Śāntiparvan of the Mahābhārata that advocate the
saṃnyāsin ideal. They include Śāntiparvan 169, 207-208, 212, 222, 284, 342 (Hill 2008, 335, fn 40).
Gregory Bailey points out that Yudhiṣṭhira himself reflects saṃnyāsin values,
for throughout the epic [Yudhiṣṭhira] seeks to renounce the kingship in favour of an ascetic life in
the forest… Such a yearning for the renouncer’s life is consistent with his yogic affiliations which
are present right from his gestation because his father, Dharma, took the form of a yogin to have
intercourse with his mother, Kuntī (Bailey 1985, 119-20).
5

The title Yogaśāstra refers to both the Yogasūtra and Yogabhāṣya. As Philipp Maas argues, these
texts were probably composed at the same time, by a single author, contrary to common opinion (Maas
2013).
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psychology, and so on. So I proceed with conceptions of the saṃnyasin and
karmayogin described in these texts, among others, in mind.
If a theory of the good life is derived from a model of Hindu sagehood, then the
plausibility of the theory will depend, at least in part, on whether the life of the Hindu
sage is good for him. So one way to assess the plausibility of any such theory is to
evaluate whether the life of the sage is good for him in the first place. And one way to
evaluate whether the life of the sage is good for him in the first place is to consider
objections to the claim that the sage’s life is good for him.
3. THE PRECLUDED PURSUITS OBJECTION
I adopt the current objection to the claim that the Hindu sage lives the good life from
Roy W. Perrett. Perrett adapts this objection from Susan Wolf’s well-known paper,
“Moral Saints.” Wolf’s version of the objection is aimed at western moral saint
ideals. She takes the basic objection to apply not only to the moral saint ideal that
might be derived from so-called “common sense morality,” but also from modern
moral theories like utilitarianism and the philosophy of Kant. For the sake of
simplicity in what follows, I focus on the version of this argument that Wolf levels
against the moral saint of common sense morality.
Wolf argues that the moral saint ideal is not worth pursuing because it requires the
moral saint to abandon too much of what makes life worth living. She claims that
according to common sense morality, the life of the moral saint is “dominated by a
commitment to improving the welfare of others or of society as a whole” (Wolf 1982,
420). To say that this commitment “dominates” the saint’s life is to say that it
invariably overrides all other considerations, leaving little to no room for the pursuit
of non-moral ends. This means that the saint is unable to cultivate non-moral virtues,
interests, activities, relationships, and so on.6
The moral saint generally cannot cultivate his interest in gourmet cooking or
interior design, for example. He cannot learn the oboe, work at improving his
backhand, or spend time reading Victorian novels (Wolf 1982, 421-22), since these
activities are generally not the best means to maximally improving the welfare of
others.
These pursuits might seem whimsical, and the fact that the saint must abandon
them trivial, but the same reasons that count against learning the oboe seem to count
against pursuing a graduate degree, mastering a vocation, cultivating deep
6

Wolf generally emphasizes the importance of pursuing or cultivating these non-moral ends, rather
than accomplishing or “having” them (although see Wolf 1982, 426), since it is generally their pursuit
rather than their attainment that conflicts with maximizing the general welfare. Another reason to
emphasize their cultivation is that many of the non-moral ends that she has in mind cannot be attained
in any final way, and hence, might require persistent cultivation.
This should not be taken to imply that Wolf does not count some degree of success in these
pursuits to be essential to the good life. In what follows, I also tend to talk about the pursuit of nonmoral ends as opposed to their attainment, but I too do not mean to deny that some degree of success in
these pursuits might also be essential to the good life. To repeatedly qualify claims about the pursuit of
non-moral ends in this way, however, would be unnecessarily clumsy.
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interpersonal relationships, and so on. At any given time, a person probably better
serves the general welfare by working more directly to alleviate hunger, illiteracy,
illness, and violence (Wolf 1982, 428, Cf. Williams 1973, 115-18). A life entirely
devoid of every such pursuit, however, seems deficient.
Wolf admits that there might be circumstances in which the pursuit of non-moral
ends maximally improves the welfare of others. “It may be,” for example, “that a
good golf game is just what is needed to secure that big donation from Oxfam” (Wolf
1982, 425). Even in these kinds of cases, however, the moral saint does not pursue
non-moral virtues, interests, activities, and so on for their own sakes – independent of
their relations to improving the general welfare. “[F]or a moral saint, the existence of
these interests and skills can be given at best the status of happy accidents – they
cannot be encouraged for their own sakes as distinct, independent aspects of the
realization of human good” (Wolf 1982, 425). The moral saint pursues these things –
if he does at all – only as means to, or as constituents of the further or broader end of
improving the general welfare (Wolf 1982, 429). A life entirely devoid of the pursuit
of such ends for their own sakes, however, seems deficient.
Wolf adds that when a person values things only under a more general description
– such as under the general description of ‘contribution to the general welfare’ – it
suggests “not only a weakness but a shallowness of appreciation of the aspects in
question” (Wolf 1982, 429-30). If a person values a personal relationship, for
example, only as a means to the general welfare, then presumably he abandons the
relationship as soon as it is no longer the optimum means to this end.
The same will be true if he values the relationship only as a constituent of the
general welfare. Once some more valuable, but incompatible constituent (or means) is
available, he should abandon the relationship. This presumably undermines his
capacity to participate in the relationship fully, and probably undermines his capacity
to have certain types of relationships altogether. The same might be said of his
commitments to pursue non-moral virtues, interests, activities, and so on. A life in
which every non-moral commitment of this sort is contingent and shallow, however,
seems deficient.7 In what follows, I refer to this argument as the ‘Precluded Pursuits
Objection’.
7

Peter Railton replies to what might seem like a similar objection.
It might be objected that one cannot really regard a person or a project as an end as such if one’s
commitment is in this way contingent or overridable. But were this so, we would be able to have
very few commitments to ends as such. For example, one could not be committed to both one’s
spouse and one’s child as ends as such, since at most one of these commitments could be
overriding in the case of conflict. It is easy to confuse the notion of a commitment to an end as
such (or for its own sake) with that of an overriding commitment (Railton 1984, 141).

The objection that I am concerned with here, however, is not that the pursuit of every end for its own
sake must inevitably override all other considerations. Instead, the objection is that a life in which
every pursuit other than the pursuit of the improvement of the general welfare is entirely contingent on
its relations to some further (or broader) end is deficient – at least in those cases where the relations are
subject to regular change, as they seem to be in the case of the moral saint.
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Perrett considers whether a version of the Precluded Pursuits Objection might be
leveled against the Hindu sage ideal. He first formulates the objection in the context
of the Bhagavadgītā (Gītā). He says,
[t]he ideal of the moral saint which the Gītā presents us with is not one to which we
should reasonably aspire since the single-minded pursuit of such an ideal would involve
giving up too much of what makes a life worth living. Even if we could achieve such a
standard, to do so would be undesirable (Perrett 1998, 30).

This formulation of the objection suggests that Perrett means to consider whether a
version of the Precluded Pursuits Objection applies to the karmayogin ideal of the
Gītā in particular.
Perrett eventually broadens his focus, however, to include other texts and
traditions, including the Dharmaśāstras, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Advaita Vedānta, and others
(Perrett 1998, 33-34), some of which do not advocate the karmayogin ideal. Within
this broader context, Perrett formulates the objection again.
[I]s not the cost of pursuing liberation too high? For if the only way to protect ourselves
from [the] suffering [of rebirth] is to practise yoga and attain mokṣa [liberation], then
have we not paid far too much for what we can gain (Perrett 1998, 40)?

This passage suggests two things. First, it suggests that on Perrett’s adapted version
of the Precluded Pursuits Objection, it is the pursuit of mokṣa that threatens to
override all other considerations. The Hindu sage’s pursuit of mokṣa, on this version
of the argument, parallels the moral saint’s pursuit of the general welfare.
Second, it implies that this version of the Precluded Pursuits Objection might be
leveled against any conception of the Hindu sage, so long as it claims that the sage
pursues mokṣa single-mindedly. Hence, the objection might be leveled against either
the karmayogin or the saṃnyāsin ideal.
If this objection parallels Wolf’s Precluded Pursuits Objection, then the objection
must run roughly as follows. The Hindu sage single-mindedly pursues mokṣa.8 This
moral commitment9 overrides all non-moral considerations, and hence, precludes the
pursuit of non-moral virtues, interests, activities, relationships, and so on for their
own sakes. A life entirely devoid of every such pursuit seems deficient. Hence the
Hindu sage seems to forsake the good life.
If the Hindu sage forsakes the good life, then the life of the sage cannot be a
model on which to base a theory of the good life. If the sage’s life is not good for him
in the first place, then no theory of the good life that is inferred from the model of the
Hindu sage will be plausible.
8

As Bailey points out, the nivṛtti “ideology and associated life style is quite simply attuned to the
attainment of mokṣa. Everything is rendered subservient to this one goal” (Bailey 1983, 20). This
suggests that this central claim of the Precluded Pursuits Objection is at least true of the saṃnyāsin.
9
It might seem strange to take the sage’s commitment to attain mokṣa as a moral commitment. See
below.
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4. CLARIFICATION OF THE PRECLUDED PURSUIT OBJECTION
Before I consider possible replies to the Precluded Pursuits Objection to Hindu Sage
Ideals, I want to offer some clarifications of the objection itself. First, the Precluded
Pursuits Objection states that the life of the Hindu sage is deficient because the sage’s
single-minded pursuit of mokṣa, in particular, precludes his pursuit of non-moral
virtues, interests, activities, relationships, and so on for their own sakes. This is the
objection that I evaluate in the rest of this paper.
It might be, however, that there are other reasons to think that the sage is
precluded from pursuing non-moral virtues, interests, and so on. One such objection
states that the Hindu sage does not pursue non-moral virtues, interests, activities,
relationships, and so on for their own sakes because he does not desire earthly things
for their own sakes. If the sage does not desire earthly things for their own sakes, and
if desires motivate actions, then presumably the sage does not pursue earthly things
for their own sakes. And if the sage does not pursue earthly things for their own
sakes, then he does not pursue non-moral virtues, interests, and so on for their own
sakes.
I consider this and other related objections elsewhere.10 For now, however, I am
concerned with whether the sage’s single-minded pursuit of mokṣa in particular
implies that he does not pursue non-moral virtues, interests, and so on for their own
sakes.
Second, the Precluded Pursuits Objection does not state that a person must pursue
non-moral virtues, interests, activities, relationships, and so on for their own sakes in
order to live the good life. It only says that a person who does not pursue any of these
things for their own sakes does not live the good life. This is consistent with allowing
that a person might not pursue non-moral virtues for their own sakes, and still live the
good life. It is consistent with allowing that a person might not pursue non-moral
relationships for their own sakes, and still live the good life, and so on.
The saṃnyāsin might seem straightforwardly precluded from pursuing non-moral
relationships for their own sakes. He is consistently characterized as abandoning
family, friends, and acquaintances. He is even characterized as avoiding places where
he might be recognized. This, by itself, however, does not entail that he is subject to
the Precluded Pursuits Objection.
The saṃnyāsin is only subject to the Precluded Pursuits Objection if he is
precluded from the pursuit of non-moral virtues, interests, activities, and so on as
well. The same will be true of the karmayogin. The thought, then, is not that a person
must pursue all of the things that the Hindu sage seems precluded from pursuing in
order to live the good life. The point is that he must pursue at least some of them.
10

My tentative view is that this alternative version of the objection can be avoided, so long as the
pursuit of non-moral virtues, interests, and so on might be motivated by states other than desires. This
seems plausible in light of the distinction between desires and ‘mere purposes’ for which I argue
elsewhere (Framarin 2009).
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Consequently, the Precluded Pursuits Objection does not state that a person must
pursue any particular non-moral virtue, interest, activity, relationship, and so on. It
does not say, for example, that a person must pursue the non-moral virtues involved
in gourmet cooking or interior design. It does not claim that a person must pursue a
relationship with a parent, spouse, or child in particular. All it says is that a person
must pursue some of those things that might be classified as non-moral virtues,
interests, activities, relationships, and so on.
5. A REPLY TO THE PRECLUDED PURSUITS OBJECTION
There are a number of replies that might be offered to the Precluded Pursuits
Objection.11 Perrett replies that the Hindu sage ideals are supererogatory, and hence,
not strictly required. This reply seems to conflate two distinct objections, however.12
The first objection is the Precluded Pursuits Objection, which, again, claims that the
Hindu sage forsakes the good life in his pursuit of liberation.
The second objection is the Demandingness Objection, which claims that a certain
moral theory (or system) requires too much of its adherents. As Garrett Cullity points
out, “[w]hen moral philosophers first started talking of ‘the problem of
demandingness’, they were referring to an alleged problem concerning how much is
demanded of anyone attempting to do what certain moral theories claim is morally
required of us” (Cullity 2009, 8). To claim that certain standards are supererogatory,
and hence, not required, then, might be a convincing reply to the Demandingness
Objection (Hooker 2009, 151-52). It is not convincing, however, as a reply to the
Precluded Pursuits Objection, just because the Precluded Pursuits Objection does not
charge that the demanding standards are required.13
An alternative reply states that there is good reason to think that in pursuing his
own mokṣa, the sage pursues an end that is at least partly non-moral.14 The attainment
11

Some replies might admit that the absence of these pursuits in the life of the sage constitutes a prima
facie diminution of his welfare, but then insist that this loss is compensated by other gains (or other
precluded losses). I consider replies of this sort elsewhere.
Another possible reply points out that in the classical formulation of the āśrama system, a person
typically becomes a saṃnyāsin in old age. If he has spent the earlier parts of his life in pursuit of nonmoral virtues, interests, and so on for their own sakes, the intuition that his life is deficient is
significantly weakened. (My thanks to Roopen Majithia for this suggestion.) This reply might not work
in the case of the karmayogin, however, since the karmayogin ideal is not reserved for old age. It also
might not work in those cases for which nearly every text allows an exception – cases in which a
person acquires the detachment suited to the saṃnyāsin before old age (see, for example,
Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad 138-39, 149, Paramahaṃsaparivrājaka Upaniṣad 278).
12
My thanks to Stephen Harris for bringing this important point to my attention.
13
Charles Goodman (Goodman 2009, 133-39) offers a reply to the Demandingness Objection as it
might apply to the Buddhist bodhisattva ideal that parallels Perrett’s reply. He also explicitly
distinguishes this objection from the Precluded Pursuits Objection, however, to which he offers a
separate reply (Goodman 2009, 141-44). Stephen Harris considers the Demandingness Objection in the
Buddhist context as well, but offers a distinct reply (2014, 32-64).
14
That mokṣa is at least partly a non-moral end seems clear for the reasons I outline just below. This is
presumably why Louis Dumont describes the saṃnyāsin as “an end for himself” (Dumont 1966, 235).
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of mokṣa amounts to the end of rebirth. Suffering pervades rebirth. Hence, in
attaining mokṣa, the sage eliminates his own suffering (Perrett 1998, 53). If the state
of mokṣa is also positively pleasurable – as most texts and traditions claim – then the
sage is further benefitted.
If the state of mokṣa is beneficial to the sage, however, then presumably he
pursues mokṣa at least in part for this reason. It is hard to imagine that the sage does
not at least see the elimination of his own suffering as a direct reason to attain mokṣa.
And insofar as he is motivated by this fact, he is motivated by prudential, non-moral
reasons. Hence he pursues at least one non-moral end for its own sake – namely, his
own mokṣa. So it is false that the Hindu sage is precluded from pursuing non-moral
ends for their own sakes.
This reply should seem unsatisfying, however. The Precluded Pursuits Objection
charges that the Hindu sage’s single-minded pursuit of mokṣa precludes his pursuit of
a wide range of non-moral ends, the pursuit of at least some of which is essential to
the good life. These non-moral ends include non-moral virtues, interests, activities,
relationships, and so on. Even if the sage pursues a non-moral end in pursuing mokṣa,
however, his single-minded pursuit of mokṣa still seems to preclude his pursuit of
non-moral virtues, interests, activities, relationships, and so on for their own sakes,
just because mokṣa is the only non-moral end that the sage pursues for its own sake.
In discussing Wolf’s version of the Precluded Pursuits Objection, I mentioned that
Wolf allows that the moral saint might pursue non-moral virtues, interests, activities,
relationships, and so on. She insists, however, that if the moral saint pursues these
things, he pursues them only as means to the general welfare and/or as constituents of
the general welfare. He fails to pursue these things for their own sakes. This, Wolf
claims, makes his life deficient.
The same considerations suggest that the life of the Hindu sage is deficient. Even
if the Hindu sage pursues a wide range of things, the fact that he pursues them only as
means to and/or as constituents of mokṣa implies that he does not pursue them for
their own sakes. This seems true, however, whether mokṣa is a moral or a non-moral
end.
If mokṣa is a non-moral end, then those things that the sage pursues only as means
to and/or as constituents of mokṣa might be non-moral ends as well. These ends might
be diverse. Many Hindu texts and traditions take equanimity, for example, to be
among the virtues that the Hindu sage cultivates (Yogaśāstra 2.55, Bhagavadgītā
2.56, and so on). So the sage pursues non-moral virtue. Many Hindu texts and
traditions assume that the sage cultivates a relationship with a guru as a means to
attaining mokṣa (Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad 157, Brhat-Saṃnyasa Upaniṣad 254).
So the sage pursues non-moral relationships.
It is not enough, however, to note that the sage cultivates non-moral virtues,
relationships, and so on. If the sage does indeed pursue mokṣa single-mindedly, then
I add the word ‘primarily’ to leave open the possibility that the sage’s pursuit of mokṣa is also the
pursuit of a moral end. This might be the case if mokṣa is an embodied state of benevolence, as many
contemporary authors argue (for example, Whicher 1998; Fort 1998).
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his pursuit of the non-moral virtue of equanimity, his pursuit of a non-moral
relationship with a guru, and so on are part of his pursuit of mokṣa. He pursues these
things only in virtue of their relations with mokṣa. He does not pursue them for their
own sakes.
Additionally, as Wolf points out, such bases for the appreciation of things are
inherently shallow and contingent. If the sage pursues the relationship with his guru,
for example, only as a means to, or as a constituent of the end of mokṣa, then he
should abandon the relationship when some better but incompatible means or
constituent arises, or (perhaps) when mokṣa is attained.
This kind of evaluation of relationships presumably undermines the sage’s
capacity to participate in this (or any) relationship fully, however, and this seems to
undermine his ability to live the good life. This concern is only magnified by the
repeated claims that the sage is impartial toward friend and foe (Nāradaparivrājaka
Upaniṣad 195, Bhagavadgītā 6.9). The same might be true of the sage’s merely
contingent commitment to the cultivation of non-moral virtues, interests, and so on as
well.
All of this suggests that the Hindu sage is precluded from pursuing non-moral
virtues, interests, activities, relationships, and so on for their own sakes. His life
seems deficient for this reason, even if his single-minded pursuit of mokṣa amounts to
the single-minded pursuit of a non-moral end. And if it turns out that the Hindu sage
forsakes the good life, then any theory of the good life that is derived from his
example will be implausible.
6. A SUPPLEMENT TO THE REPLY TO
THE PRECLUDED PURSUITS OBJECTION
The reply just outlined can be strengthened by adopting the distinction between de
dicto and de re motivations. Vanessa Carbonell utilizes this distinction in replying to
the Precluded Pursuits Objection as it applies to the moral saint. She points out that
sentences like ‘A is only motivated to improve the general welfare’ are ambiguous.
On the one hand, the sentence might be read de dicto, to mean that A has only one
non-derivative motivation – the motivation to improve the general welfare. On this
reading, A’s motivation to bring about any end other than the improvement of the
general welfare is derivative; it is derived entirely from his motivation to improve the
general welfare. If A is motivated to alleviate a particular person’s hunger, for
example, this motivation is derived entirely from his motivation to improve the
general welfare (Carbonell 2009, 390).
Another way to describe A’s de dicto motivation to improve the general welfare is
to say that the only consideration that A counts as a direct reason to perform a
particular action is the fact that the action will contribute toward improving the
general welfare. In the case in which A improves the general welfare by alleviating a
particular person’s hunger, the fact that A’s action will alleviate the person’s hunger
is only an indirect reason to perform the action. A takes the person’s hunger as only
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an indirect reason to act. He is unmotivated by the fact of the person’s hunger by
itself.
On the other hand, the sentence ‘A is only motivated to improve the general
welfare’ might be read de re, to mean that A has a distinct, non-derivative motivation
to bring about some or all of the specific ends that he takes to contribute to the
improvement of the general welfare. On this reading, if A is motivated to alleviate a
particular person’s hunger, then he has a non-derivative motivation to alleviate the
person’s hunger. His motivation to alleviate the person’s hunger is not entirely
derived from the more abstract motivation to improve the general welfare (Carbonell
2009, 390; 2011, 461), even if the more abstract consideration contributes to his
motivation. He counts the fact that a person is hungry as a direct reason to alleviate it.
Carbonell argues that Wolf’s version of the Precluded Pursuits Objection assumes
that the moral saint is motivated to improve the general welfare de dicto, rather than
de re. The following passage from Wolf seems to support this interpretation.
[T]here is something odd about the idea of morality itself, or moral goodness, serving as
the object of a dominant passion in the way that a more concrete and specific vision of a
goal (even a concrete moral goal) might be imagined to serve. Morality itself does not
seem to be a suitable object of passion (Wolf 1982, 424, cited at Carbonell 2009, 390;
2013, 462).

Carbonell takes the distinction between “morality itself” and “a concrete moral goal”
in this passage to correspond to the distinction between the de dicto and de re
readings of the motivation to bring about the general welfare. She concludes that
Wolf
seems to think that a moral saint must be motivated by ‘morality itself’ under that
description, as an abstract concept, rather than being motivated directly by those things in
the world that the concept picks out, like the relief of suffering (Carbonell 2009, 390).

This interpretation of Wolf seems well supported by Wolf’s claim that the moral saint
– this time of the utilitarian variety – “values [non-moral virtues, interests, and so on]
only because of and insofar as they are a part of the general happiness. He values
them, as it were, [only] under the description ‘a contribution to the general
happiness’” (Wolf 1982, 429, emphasis added).
These quotations also suggest that Wolf takes the claim that the moral saint does
not pursue non-moral virtues, interests, activities, relationships, and so on for their
own sakes to follow from his single-minded pursuit of the improvement of the
general welfare read de dicto. The moral saint pursues non-moral virtues, interests,
activities, and so on only in virtue of their relations to the end of improving the
general welfare. He does not pursue them for their own sakes, because he does not
take himself to have direct reasons to pursue them.
The assumption that the moral saint is motivated to improve the general welfare
de dicto, rather than de re, however, seems false. As Michael Smith says in a related
context,
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[g]ood people care non-derivatively about honesty, the weal and woe of their children
and friends, the well-being of their fellows, people getting what they deserve, justice,
equality, and the like, not just one thing: doing what they believe to be right (Smith 1994,
75, cited at Carbonell 2013, 463).

Good people presumably care about improving the general welfare (and/or some
other general moral principle). What seems implausible is that the morally best
person pursues honesty, justice, the alleviation of hunger, and so on only because of
their contributions to the improvement of the general welfare. It seems implausible
that the morally best person does not take the fact that some person is hungry as a
direct reason to act.
Indeed, it might even be that the moral saint pursues various goals that contribute
to the improvement of the general welfare with little to no thought that these pursuits
contribute toward improving the general welfare. “In many cases, an agent – even the
moral saint – need not be interested in the ‘rightness’ of her action” per se (Carbonell
2009, 395). This only seems possible, however, if the moral saint counts
considerations other than the improvement of the general welfare as direct reasons to
act.
There is little doubt that in order for the moral saint to effectively improve the
general welfare, he often must have an eye toward this broader goal. This broader
consideration, however, might function primarily as a way of “mediating” among
those motivations that are already present (Carbonell 2013, 466), rather than as a
source for generating more specific motivations.15 The moral saint counts the fact that
someone is hungry as a direct reason to alleviate the person’s hunger, but first reflects
on whether alleviating this person’s hunger is a sufficiently good way to improve the
general welfare. If it is not, then the saint’s motivation to alleviate this person’s
hunger might not prevail. He might not act to alleviate the person’s hunger. If it is a
sufficiently good way to maximize welfare, however, then the saint acts to do so (at
least in part) out of direct concern for the person who suffers from hunger. Hence, the
moral saint’s motivation to improve the general welfare should be read de re, rather
than strictly de dicto.16
If the moral saint’s motivation to improve the general welfare is read de re,
however, then he pursues a much wider range of ends for their own sakes than might
be thought. As I said, the person who is motivated to improve the general welfare
might have a distinct, non-derivative motivation to bring about each of the specific
ends that he takes to contribute to the improvement of the general welfare. So he

15

As Sigrún Svavarsdóttir points out, some derivative motivations might become non-derivative
motivations. A person might choose to work with a particular population of people motivated to
improve the general welfare, for example, but come to pursue the welfare of these particular people for
its own sake (Svavarsdottir 1999, 206, cited at Carbonell 2013, 394).
16
Carbonell finally claims that the moral saint’s motivation to improve the general welfare should be
read as both de re and de dicto (Carbonell 2013, 465).
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might have direct motivations to alleviate hunger, improve literacy, eradicate
tuberculosis, and so on.
The distinction between de dicto and de re motivation is certainly helpful in
clarifying the notion of a moral saint. Wolf’s failure to explicitly note the distinction,
and her assumption that the saint’s motivation to improve the general welfare should
be read de dicto is a shortcoming in her paper. This is not to say, however, that the
distinction resolves Wolf’s fundamental objection.
Wolf’s fundamental objection, remember, is that the moral saint fails to pursue
non-moral virtues, interests, activities, relationships, and so on for their own sakes.
One reason to think that Carbonell has not refuted this charge is that the examples
that she offers of ends that the moral saint might be directly motivated to pursue are
all moral ends. When she considers how a moral saint would answer the question,
‘What’s your life’s passion?’ she claims that “the moral saint as I conceive of him
would answer with the content of his moral commitments, not the fact that he is so
committed. To ‘What’s your life’s passion?’ he would answer ‘healing the sick’ or
eradicating tuberculosis’” (Carbonell 2009, 391).
As Carbonell says, healing the sick and eradicating tuberculosis are examples of
moral commitments. It is unclear, however, how a more direct commitment to
specific, concrete moral goals avoids the charge that the moral saint is precluded from
pursuing non-moral virtues, interests, activities, relationships, and so on for their own
sakes. All of those ends that the moral saint pursues for their own sakes still might be
moral ends, and hence, exclude all non-moral ends. His life might still be deficient for
this reason.17
This initial concern might be avoided by noting that much of what Carbonell says
might apply to non-moral commitments as well. The moral saint who secures the
donation to Oxfam by cultivating his golf game, for example, might be directly
motivated to improve his golf game independent of its contribution to the general
welfare, just as he might be directly motivated to alleviate hunger independent of its
contribution to the general welfare. This fact about him might not be part of the
description of his moral sainthood. The point, however, is that the moral saint might
still be directly motivated to pursue specific non-moral ends. He might be motivated
to pursue these ends independent of their relations to the improvement of the general
welfare, just as he might be motivated to pursue moral ends independent of their
relations to the improvement of the general welfare. So when he pursues these nonmoral ends, he might be both directly and indirectly motivated to do so. He might
pursue them (at least in part) for their own sakes.

17

Carbonell seems to think that it is enough to prove that the moral saint is motivated to pursue
individual moral goals. “[A] moral saint whose life is ‘dominated by the motivation to be moral’ is
much less unattractive when we interpret this motivation as being toward doing morally good things de
re rather than solely de dicto” (Carbonell 2009, 392). This seems to misidentify the fundamental
objection, however. The fundamental problem with the life of the moral saint is not that he is
“annoying or fanatical” (Carbonell 2009, 392), but that he is unable to whole-heartedly pursue nonmoral virtues, interests, activities, relationships, and so on for their own sakes.
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It might be objected that the person who best improves the general welfare by
developing his golf game is a rarity. Most people do not best improve the general
welfare by pursuing non-moral virtues, interests, relationships, and so on. As
Carbonell points out in her example of Paul Farmer, however – whom she takes to be
a living moral saint – the moral saint’s activities tend to involve the pursuit of a wide
range of ends. Farmer travels extensively, learns foreign languages, studies different
religious traditions and mythologies, and so on (Carbonell 2009, 378). If he pursues
these things at least in part for their own sakes, then it is not the case that he fails to
pursue non-moral virtues, interests, activities, relationships, and so on.
This adapted reply from Carbonell still seems problematic, however. Even in
those cases in which the moral saint actually pursues non-moral ends for their own
sakes, his pursuit of any non-moral end remains entirely contingent on the relations
between the specific non-moral end and the further (or broader) end of improving the
general welfare. His motivation to cultivate his golf game might not derive entirely
from his motivation to improve the general welfare, but the moral saint seems
committed to allowing the former to move him only when it is a means to improving
the general welfare. Once the non-moral virtue, interest, activity, or relationship no
longer contributes sufficiently to the end of improving the general welfare, then, the
moral saint must abandon it. Farmer must abandon his study of French as soon as he
can best serve the general welfare in a non-French speaking country.
As I mentioned above, this kind of contingency in a person’s commitments
undermines his ability to participate in them fully. This seems most startling in the
example of a personal relationship (where it seems to preclude close personal
relationships altogether), but it applies to other pursuits as well. A life in which every
pursuit of a non-moral end is contingent in this way seems deficient.
Carbonell might reply to these concerns by pointing out that they assume that the
moral saint always acts to maximize the general welfare. As she convincingly argues
with the example of Paul Farmer, however, people are often counted as moral saints
even though they do not always act to maximize the general welfare (Carbonell 2009,
378).
If a moral saint need not always act to maximize the general welfare, then his
commitments to non-moral ends might be less contingent. He might maintain a nonmoral personal relationship, for example, even after it ceases to be a means to
improving the general welfare, just because he is not committed to improving the
general welfare with every action he performs (Cf., Adams 1984, 396). Farmer might
continue to master French, even though it does not contribute to the improvement of
the general welfare.
It is open to Wolf to reply to these kinds of considerations, however, by insisting
that people like Farmer do not fully meet the moral ideal that common sense and
western moral theories entail. The fact that ordinary language does not track this
conception of moral sainthood is hardly a reply to this charge (Perrett 1998, 32).
Alternatively, Wolf might admit that Farmer is a moral saint, but insist that
common sense and western moral theories count a person who better maximizes
welfare as even more praiseworthy. If the life of this most praiseworthy person is
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deficient, however, then the ideal that common sense and western moral theories
endorse is not worth pursuing.
The distinction between de dicto and de re motivation is much more helpful,
however, in avoiding the Precluded Pleasures Objection to Hindu sage ideals. If the
Hindu sage’s motivation to pursue mokṣa is understood de re rather than de dicto,
then he might be directly motivated to pursue each of those ends that contribute to the
attainment of mokṣa. Unlike in the case of the moral saint, however, most of the more
specific ends that the sage pursues are non-moral ends – in part because the goal of
mokṣa is itself a non-moral end.
A householder remains embedded in a close-knit community that includes
parents, spouse, children, and friends. He pursues a vocation, maintains an active
religious life – in the form of ritual and devotional practices – has time to pursue
hobbies, indulge in diversions, and so on. The same might be true of the karmayogin,
who continues to perform his varṇāśramadharma (obligations in virtue of class and
life stage), but in a spirit of renunciation.18
Many of these ends might be understood as non-moral ends. Hence, the
karmayogin might pursue a wide range of non-moral ends that include non-moral
virtues, activities, interests, relationships, and so on. If he pursues these things for
their own sakes – as the de dicto/de re distinction makes possible – then he pursues
non-moral virtues, interests, activities, relationships, and so on for their own sakes.
In this case, however, there is little reason to think that the demand to pursue
mokṣa will make his pursuit of these non-moral ends highly contingent, in the way
that the moral saint’s pursuit of the general welfare makes his pursuit of specific nonmoral ends highly contingent, since the karmayogin can remain committed to these
activities for the duration of his life. There are no obvious scenarios in which the two
must conflict.
Moreover, the karmayogin seems required to pursue career, devotional practices,
strong family relationships, and so on. The pursuit of these things is part of what
18

A reviewer for Comparative Philosophy raises questions about whether the karmayogin can really
pursue hobbies for their own sakes. I assume here that the pursuit of hobbies and diversions is a normal
component in the life of the householder. If the karmayogin is, in principle, indistinguishable – at least
on the surface – from the dutiful householder, then presumably the pursuit of hobbies and diversions is
part of the life of the karmayogin as well. If the pursuit of hobbies and diversions is part of his life as a
householder, then it is consistent with his single-minded pursuit of mokṣa, in the sense that these
pursuits are not obstacles to his attainment of mokṣa. If this is right, then there is little reason to think
that he must pursue hobbies and diversions only in virtue of their contribution to the attainment of
mokṣa, just as there is little reason to think that the moral saint must cultivate his golf game only as
means to improving the general welfare. The karmayogin might, instead, pursue these things for their
own sakes.
There might, again, be other reasons – like the sage’s supposed desirelessness – that preclude the
karmayogin from pursuing hobbies and diversions for their own sakes. This, however, is an issue that I
have already set aside (see section three above).
Finally, the second clarification that I offered in section three above implies that neither the
karmayogin nor the saṃnyāsin need pursue hobbies or diversions in order to live the good life. The
karmayogin might live the good life despite being precluded from the pursuit of hobbies and diversions
for their own sakes, so long as he pursues other relevant non-moral ends for their own sakes.
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makes him a karmayogin. These ends are at least partly non-moral, just because they
benefit the karmayogin himself. Hence, the karmayogin’s pursuit of certain nonmoral virtues, interests, activities, relationships, and so on are necessary, rather than
contingent.19
The saṃnyāsin lives a much more austere life than the karmayogin does. He still
pursues a wide range of non-moral ends, however. He pursues equanimity,
meditation, concentration, knowledge of ultimate reality, solitude, and so on.20 Hence
he pursues at least some of those non-moral ends, the pursuit of at least some of
which is essential to the good life. Again, the de dicto/de re distinction makes it
possible for him to pursue these things for their own sakes.
Furthermore, his commitments are not contingent in the way that the moral saint’s
commitments seem to be either, since the relations between these things (such as
equanimity, and so on) and mokṣa are necessary and enduring, rather than contingent.
The samnyāsin cultivates equanimity, for example, until he attains mokṣa (as does the
karmayogin). Once he attains mokṣa, he exhibits this virtue as long as he remains
embodied. To be perfectly equanimous in this way is simply part of what it is to be
liberated. The same is true of many of the other virtues and pursuits of the saṃnyāsin
that I mentioned above.21
This suggests that both the saṃnyāsin and the karmayogin might pursue some of
those ends the pursuit of which seems essential to the good life. Furthermore, they
might pursue these ends for their own sakes, independent of their relations with the
end of mokṣa, and in a way that is not highly contingent on circumstances. This
19

My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for Comparative Philosophy for pushing me on this point. It is
worth noting, however, that this conclusion is stronger than it has to be. It is enough that the
karmayogin’s non-moral pursuits are consistent with his pursuit of mokṣa. This, by itself, allows him to
fully commit to their pursuit. They need not be necessary means or constituents of mokṣa.
20
In the case of the saṃnyāsin, there might still be questions about whether the range of his pursuits is
sufficiently broad. I think they are, but more might be said on this matter.
21
It might be tempting to think that the same reply is available in the case of the moral saint. Indeed,
Wolf says that the moral saint “must have and cultivate those qualities which are apt to allow him to
treat others as justly and kindly as possible… He will be patient, considerate, even-tempered,
hospitable, charitable in thought as well as in deed” (Wolf 1982, 421). If the moral saint must pursue
these qualities, however, then his commitment to them is not highly contingent. If he can also pursue
them for their own sakes – in light of the de dicto/de re distinction – then there might be some sense in
which these virtues are at least partly non-moral. This suggests that the moral saint can at least pursue
non-moral virtues for their own sakes in a way that is not highly contingent.
Even the saint’s pursuit of these virtues, however, turns out to be highly contingent, just because
the virtues that might be useful in promoting the general welfare are highly variable. It is hard not to
think that the moral saint must be saintly in standard ways that involve patience, benevolence, and so
on. For any virtue on this list, however, there might be circumstances in which the virtue must be
abandoned. Indeed, the common objection that maximizing consequentialist analyses of right action
make anything permissible seems to entail not only that any virtue might be counter-productive to
improving the general welfare, but also that any vice might be required. If a moral saint might
maximize welfare by playing golf, performing brain surgeries, managing a large charity organization,
or smuggling refugees across borders, and if the optimum activity might change due to changing
circumstances, then it is hard to see how the moral saint might be fully committed to the pursuit of any
specific range of non-moral virtues.
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means that they can fully commit to the pursuit of these ends in the way that Wolf
seems to say one must in order to live the good life – and in a way that the moral saint
cannot. If this is right, then the Hindu sage is not subject to the Precluded Pursuits
Objection. This leaves open the possibility that the sage’s life is not only good for
him, but exceedingly good for him, and hence, that a plausible theory of the good life
might be derived from his example.
One lingering question here has to do with the initial claim that the Hindu sage
pursues mokṣa single-mindedly. It should be clear at this point that this
characterization of the sage is at least ambiguous. On the one hand, the claim might
be read to mean that the sage thinks only of mokṣa in acting, in the sense that his
exclusive intention is the attainment of mokṣa. Indeed, with this sense of the claim in
mind, the Precluded Pursuits Objection seems to apply to the sage straightforwardly.
If his exclusive intention is the attainment of mokṣa, then surely he does not pursue
other ends for their own sakes in acting.
If the sage is motivated to pursue ends other than mokṣa for their own sakes,
however, then the sage does not single-mindedly pursue mokṣa in this sense. Indeed,
there might be cases in which the sage thinks nothing at all of mokṣa, even as he acts
in a way that contributes to its attainment, just as the moral saint might not think of
improving the general welfare per se, even as he acts in a way that improves the
general welfare.
The claim that the Hindu sage pursues mokṣa single-mindedly might instead be
taken to mean that everything the sage does contributes to his attainment of mokṣa. In
this sense, the claim might be true. This reading, however, does not preclude the sage
from pursuing other ends – including non-moral virtues, interests, and so on – for
their own sakes, as long as these pursuits are consistent with his pursuit of mokṣa.
And since, for both the saṃnyāsin and the karmayogin, some pursuits of this sort are
not only consistent with the pursuit of mokṣa, but essential to it, neither ideal is
subject to the Precluded Pursuits Objection.
7. CONCLUSION
Since many Hindu texts and traditions claim that the Hindu sage lives an exceedingly
good life, it makes sense to assume, at least initially, that they take a life to be good
for the person whose life it is more generally insofar as it exemplifies those
characteristics that make the sage’s life good for the sage. If this is right, then it might
be relatively simple to infer a theory of the good life from Hindu conceptions of
sagehood.
Someone might doubt that the Hindu sage lives the good life in the first place,
however, on the grounds that his single-minded pursuit of the moral end of mokṣa
precludes his pursuit of non-moral virtues, interests, activities, and so on for their own
sakes. Since the Hindu sage’s goal of mokṣa is at least partly a non-moral end,
however, and since the sage might pursue those other non-moral ends that contribute
to the end of mokṣa – including non-moral virtues, interests, activities, and so on – for
their own sakes, in a way that is not subject to a high degree of contingency, Hindu
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sage ideals avoid the Precluded Pursuits Objection, even if western moral saint ideals
do not. This leaves open the possibility that the Hindu sage’s life is not only good, but
exceedingly good, and hence, that a plausible theory of the good life might be derived
from his example.
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